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Abstract 
 
This paper uses cross-country data from 1965 to 2008 to examine how ethnic 
heterogeneity affects the probability of technological disasters. Estimation results 
showed that ethnic heterogeneity increased the probability of technological disasters.  
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1. Introduction 
Disasters have a tremendous impact on human society. In the field of social 
science, increasing attention is being paid to the issue of natural disasters. A number of 
works have considered the relationship between disasters and economic development 
(e.g., Kahn, 2005; Skidmore and Toya, 2002; Toya and Skidmore, 2007). Disasters can 
generally be categorized as either natural or technological. The probability of natural 
disasters is not affected by the degree of economic development, whereas the level 
damage inflicted by natural disasters is (Kahn, 2005). In contrast, the probability of a 
technological disaster is largely influenced by human error—this is the differentiating 
feature between technological and natural disasters.  
Previous works state ethnic heterogeneity as a determining factor in the quality 
of a government (La Porta et al. 1999; Alesina et al., 2003). Easterly and Levine (1997) 
suggest that ethnic heterogeneity has a direct detrimental influence on economic 
growth. Ethnic heterogeneity has a negative effect on economic development through 
the reduction of investment and the probability of conflict (Mauro, 1995; Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005b).1 Vigdor (2004) provides evidence that ethnic and other 
heterogeneity in society impedes collective action. 
Technological disasters are likely to occur when collective action is not 
well-organized, because cooperation and communication among workers are important 
in ensuring that technology is well-functioning. However, while the effect of institution 
on natural disasters has been well analyzed, very few researchers, with the exception of 
Kahn (2005),2 have looked at the relationship between technological disasters and 
                                                   
1 In line with ethnic heterogeneity, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) discussed the 
influence of religious heterogeneity on economic development. 
2 Kahn (2005) mainly investigated the determinants of death caused by natural 
disasters. In addition, he also provided supplementary results regarding the 
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institution. Therefore, it is of some value to examine the relationship between 
institution and the probability of technological disasters. This paper investigates how 
ethnic heterogeneity affects the probability of technological disasters.  
 
2. Data and Model  
For the estimations in this paper I used annual data on technological disasters in 
106 countries, from 1965 to 2008. The definitions and the descriptive statistics of 
variables used in this paper are presented in Table 1. Classical works have previously 
used an ethnic fractionalization index to capture ethnic heterogeneity (Mauro, 1995; 
Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). In addition, ethnic polarization has 
also been used as an alternative measure (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005 b; 
Reynal-Querol, 2002). Thus, to check the robustness of the estimation results, I used 
both ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization as proxy variables for ethnic 
heterogeneity.3 Ethnic heterogeneity can result in conflict, hampering the cooperation 
and communication required to reduce the risk of technological accidents. If ethnic 
heterogeneity increases the probability of technological disasters, then ETPOL (or 
ETFRA) should take a positive sign. Due to a limitation in the data used in this study, 
ETPOL and ETFRA take the same values for the 1965–2008 period. 
The data on technological disasters used in this study can be considered to be 
typical count data. The Poisson regression model has been widely used to study such 
data (Greene, 2008). Thus, I used the Possion model to examine the data and the 
estimated function takes the following form: 
                                                                                                                                                     
determinants of death caused by technological disasters. 
3 Data on ethnic fractionalization and polarization is available at 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm (accessed on June 1, 2011).  
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TEDISit = 0 + 1ETPOL (or ETFRA)i + 2GDPi t+ 3POPit + 4OPENit + 5GOVSIZit 
+ 6PRSCHi + 7SESCHi + 8AGRATit + mt + eit,  
where TEDIS represents the subjective risk of a nuclear accident in country i and 
in year t. m is the year-specific effect and is controlled for by year dummies. e is an error 
term and  represents the regression parameters. TEDIS is the number of technological 
disasters that have occurred since 1965. 4  TEDIS was collected from EM-DAT 
(Emergency Events Database).5 Apart from the key variables explained earlier (TEDIS, 
ETPOL, and ETFRA), and in line with previous works examining the determinants of 
disaster damage (e.g., Kahn, 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007), the control variables are 
incorporated as independent variables as follows. Economic factors are captured by 
GDP per capita (GDP), population (POP), economic openness (OPEN), size of 
government (GOVSIZ), and proxies for human capital are expressed as primary school 
and secondary school enrollment rates (PRSCH and SESCH). As there was a lack of 
data, PRSCH and SESCH are only available for 1980 within the period 1965–2008. 
Therefore, PRSCH and SESCH are values for 1980 and are constant over time. In 
addition, the likelihood of technological disasters appears to depend on industrial 
structure and, therefore, rates for agricultural value-added (AGRAT) were also 
included.6 The greater AGRAT is, the lower the rates for the industrial sector. As a 
                                                   
4 A technological disaster is an industrial accident, miscellaneous accident, or a 
transport accident. 
5 TEDIS was obtained from the International Disaster Database (http://www.emdat.be. 
accessed on June 1, 2011). 
6 With the exception of the value-added rates, the World Bank (2010) provided rates for 
agriculture employees . However, the employee rate was not available for a number of 
countries. Thus, the rate of value-added was used. Estimation results did not change 
when AGRAT was not included. These results are available from the author upon 
request. 
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result, the probability of technological disasters decreases. All control variables were 
collected from the World Bank (2010). 
 
3. Results 
The estimation results for the Poisson model are exhibited in Table 2. I purposely 
focused on the results of the proxies for ethnic heterogeneity. The results when ETPOL 
is included are presented in columns (1)–(4), whereas those for when ETFRA is included 
are in columns (5)–(8). Z-statistics are calculated based on the robust standard errors to 
alleviate heteroscedasticity. Data regarding some variables used in this paper are not 
available for some countries. As is shown in Table 2, increases in independent variables 
leads to a decrease in observations. Hence, results for the full model exhibited in 
columns (1) and (5) are less likely to suffer from omitted variables bias, although the 
sample size is smaller than for other results. Results in columns (4) and (8) are more 
likely to suffer from the bias, while the sample size is larger. ETPOL and ETFRA take 
the anticipated positive sign in all estimations. Further, they are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with the exception of column (4) where statistical 
significance is at the 10% level. The results for ETPOL and ETFRA are robust for 
alternative specifications. These results lead me to assert that ethnic heterogeneity 
increases the probability of technological disasters.  
The significant negative sign for GDP and OPEN indicate that higher income and 
greater openness reduce the probability of technological disasters. Technology has 
advanced in those countries that are more developed. Higher levels of openness can be 
regarded as the proxy for the degree of transfer of technological knowledge from abroad. 
This transfer enables people to reduce risk, which is in line with findings that GDP and 
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openness reduce the death rate of natural disasters (Toya and Skidmore, 2007). As 
anticipated, AGRAT yields a significant negative sign. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Using cross-country data from 1965 to 2008, this paper examined how ethnic 
heterogeneity affects the probability of technological disasters. Estimation results 
suggest that ethnic heterogeneity is positively related to the probability of technological 
disasters. That is, people that live in an ethnically heterogeneous society are more likely 
to experience technological disasters, leading to economic loss. Ethnic heterogeneity 
affects economic development, and a facet of this relationship, albeit one that has not 
yet been fully explored, can be seen after a technological disaster.  
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Table 1  Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
TEDIS 
 
Number of technological disasters 1.10 3.78 
ETPOL Index of ethnic polarization 
 
0.51 0.24 
ETFRA Index of ethnic fractionalization 
 
0.43 0.27 
GDP GDP per capita (thousand dollars) 
 
6.26 8.69 
POP Population (millions) 
 
38.3 134.0 
OPEN 
 
Trade/GDP (%) 70.4 46.3 
GOVSIZ 
 
Government size (government expenditure/GDP) (%) 15.2 6.2 
PRSCH 
 
Gross primary school enrollment rate in 1980 (%) 
 
92.2 25.1 
SESCH 
 
Gross secondary school enrollment rate in 1980 (%) 
 
46.3 29.4 
AGRAT 
 
Agricultural value-added/GDP (%) 18.6 15.3 
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Table 2  Poisson estimation: dependent variable is TEDIS 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. Year dummies and regional dummies (Asia, 
Africa and South America dummies) are included in all estimations but the results are not reported to save space. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ETPOL 1.02*** 
(7.76) 
0.95*** 
(7.19) 
0.99*** 
(8.06) 
0.26* 
(1.80) 
    
ETFRA  
 
   0.91*** 
(6.53) 
0.73*** 
(5.12) 
0.67*** 
(4.77) 
1.08*** 
(6.63) 
GDP –0.05*** 
(–8.13) –0.04*** (–6.43) –0.001 (–0.21) –0.005 (–1.34) –0.05*** (–7.78) –0.03*** (–5.91) –0.001 (–0.24) 0.001 (0.39) 
POP 0.001*** 
(16.4) 
0.001*** 
(17.3) 
0.001*** 
(20.6) 
0.002*** 
(28.2) 
0.001*** 
(12.4) 
0.001*** 
(13.8) 
0.001*** 
(15.4) 
0.002*** 
(26.4) 
OPEN 
 
–0.02*** 
(–14.5) –0.01*** (–12.8) –0.01*** (–13.9)  –0.01*** (–13.4) –0.01*** (–11.8) –0.01*** (–12.7)  
GOVSIZ –0.04*** 
(–5.10) –0.03*** (–4.42) –0.01** (2.27)  –0.03*** (–3.61) –0.02*** (–3.11) –0.01 (–0.77)  
PRSCH 
 
–0.003* 
(–1.95) –0.001 (–0.85)   –0.002 (–1.47) –0.0001 (–0.04)   
SESCH 
 
0.01*** 
(6.95) 
0.02*** 
(8.29) 
  0.01*** 
(6.25) 
0.02*** 
(7.67) 
  
AGRAT 
 
–0.02*** 
(–6.62)    –0.03*** (–7.16)    
Constant 
 
–0.73 
(–1.49) –2.42*** (–6.85) –1.70*** (–5.60) –2.53*** (–8.74) –0.81* (–1.71) –2.56*** (–7.34) –1.72*** (–5.75) –2.82*** (–10.0) 
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.47 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.48 
Observations   3163   3604  3804   4727   3163   3604  3804   4727 
